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Instalment Sale Contract or Not? 
 
 
In Phillips v Scotdale Pty Ltd1 the Court of Appeal considered the operation of 
a special condition of an REIQ contract for the purchase of a parcel of 
residential land under which the deposit holder was to pay the deposit to the 
seller immediately and without any breach of contract by the purchaser.  The 
special condition also expressly provided that the deposit was to be repayable 
to the purchaser in the event of breach by the seller. 
 
The issues for the court were whether the operation of the special condition 
created an instalment sale contract for the purposes of the Property Law Act 
1974 (Qld) (such that the seller would not be entitled to terminate the contract 
without first giving the notice contemplated by s 72(1)), and further, whether 
ss 384 and 385 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) 
(‘PAMDA’) operated to invalidate the payment contemplated by the special 
condition. 
 




Section 71 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) defines an instalment contract 
as an executory contract for the sale of land in terms of which the purchaser is 
bound to make a payment or payments (other than a deposit) without 
becoming entitled to receive a conveyance in exchange for the payment or 
payments. 
 
Section 71 defines a deposit to mean a sum –  
(a) not exceeding 10% of the purchase price payable under an 
instalment contract; and 
(b) paid or payable in 1 or more amounts; and 
(c) liable to be forfeited and retained by the vendor in the event of a 
breach of contract by the purchaser 
 
Contractual provisions 
Special condition 1 of the contract, as varied, provided: 
 ‘Despite any other clause contained in this Contract (including the Terms of 
Contract) the parties agree the Purchase Price of $3,500,000.00 is to be paid to the 
Seller as follows: 
 (a)  $100,000.00 by way of part deposit payable as set out in the Reference 
Schedule; and 
 (b)  $100,000.00 by way of further part deposit payable on 4 September 2007 to be 
released immediately to the Sellers (and for the purposes of clarity the parties 
agree that Special Condition 13 shall also apply to this further part deposit); and 
 (c)  $800,000.00 on the Settlement Date; and 
 (d)  $2,500,000.00 (Balance Price) on or before 17 July 2008 … ‘ 
                                                 
1 [2008] QCA 127. 
Special condition 13 of the contract contemplated that when the purchaser 
had paid the total amount of the deposit, ie $200,000 to the deposit holder, 
that sum would be paid over to the vendors forthwith. The special condition 
provided: 
 ‘The parties mutually acknowledge, authorise and agree that as soon as 
practicable after the payment of the balance deposit the deposit holder shall pay to 
the Seller the Deposit (less the agents commission and any GST payable on that 
commission which sums shall be retained in the Agent's Trust Account pending 
settlement or earlier termination of the contract) and the Buyers shall have no claim 
against the Sellers (provided the Sellers are not in breach of the provisions hereof) 
or the deposit holder except where the Seller is in breach of its obligations under 
this Contract in which case nothing will prevent the Buyer from recovering from the 
Seller any amounts entitled to it under this Contract or at law.’ 
Argument 
 
The purchaser argued that the money described in special condition 13 as the 
‘the deposit’ was not a deposit as defined in s 71 as this money was not ‘liable 
to be forfeited and retained by the vendor in the event of a breach of contract 
by the purchaser’.  Rather, it was argued, that special condition 13 entitled the 
seller to be paid this money immediately, without waiting to see if the 
purchaser did breach the contract. 
 
This argument was resisted by the seller on the basis that special condition 13 
did not effect an immediate forfeiture.  Rather, the seller could only forfeit and 
retain this money in accordance with special condition 13 if the seller 




The Court of Appeal agreed with the conclusion of the trial judge that nothing 
in the s 71 definition of ‘deposit’ suggested that the sum deposited must be 
kept as a separate fund pending completion of the contract or that it could not 
be paid to the seller to be held by the seller prior to completion. 
 
In holding that the money paid fell within the statutory definition of a ‘deposit’, 
the Court of Appeal considered that the purchaser’s argument ignored the 
contractual right of the purchaser to recover the money from the seller if the 
seller failed to meet their contractual obligations to complete.  Under special 
condition 13 the purchaser would be entitled to sue the seller to recover the 
money paid if the seller breached the contract. 
 
As noted by Keane JA (with the agreement of de Jersey CJ and White J):  
 
The existence of such an entitlement in the purchaser is inconsistent with the proposition 
that the purchaser had once and for all lost all entitlement to that sum when it was paid to 
the vendors under special condition 13: the purchaser's right to recover this sum from the 
vendors, even if it be properly described as contingent, was not to be finally extinguished 
before the termination of the contract. Indeed, it is at least arguable that special condition 
13 meant that it would be extinguished, even upon breach by the purchaser, only if the 
vendors were not themselves in breach of contract. 
Whatever the shades of meaning of "forfeiture" or "liability to forfeiture" under the general 
law or in other statutory contexts, there can be no doubt that, when s 71 of the PLA 
speaks of the sum in question being "liable to be forfeited and retained by the vendor", 
the liability referred to is a liability to the loss of the sum which is final and absolute, not 
provisional or defeasible. One must give force to the words "and retained by the vendor" 
in para (c) of the definition of "deposit". These words confirm that the liability to forfeiture 
there referred to is a liability in the purchaser to lose the sum finally and absolutely to the 
vendor. Special condition 13 did not operate of its own terms finally and absolutely to 
extinguish the purchaser's entitlement to the moneys payable by the purchaser under 
special condition 1. That loss of entitlement could only occur upon the occurrence of 
subsequent events, one of which was breach of the contract by the purchaser.2 
 
As the money in question was held to be a deposit within the meaning of s 71, 
the contract between the parties was not an instalment contract and the seller 
was justified in terminating the contract without first giving a notice of the type 





 378  Application  
o (1)  Sections 379 and 380 apply if an amount is received by a 
licensee—  
 (a)  for a transaction; or 
 (b)  with a written direction for its use.  
Example of paragraph (b)— 
an amount received by a real estate agent with a 
written direction to use it for advertising or marketing 
by the agent or another person 
o (2)  In this section—  
amount, received by a licensee for a transaction— 
 (a)  includes deposit and purchase monies for the  
transaction; but 
 (b)  does not include an amount payable to the licensee 
in relation to the transaction in refund of an expense 
the licensee was authorised to incur and did incur and 
for which the licensee holds a receipt. 
 
 379  Dealing with amount on receipt  
                                                 
2 Phillips v Scotdale Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 127, [23] – [24]. 
A licensee must, immediately on receiving the amount— 
o (a)  pay it to the licensee's general trust account; or 
o (b)  if section 380(1) applies, invest it under section 380(2). 
Example of paragraph (a)– 
A licensee who collects an amount of rent for a property owner 
must pay the amount to the licensee's general trust account before 
the money can be paid to the owner. 
Maximum penalty–200 penalty units or 3 years imprisonment. 
… 
 384  When payments may be made from trust accounts  
o (1)  An amount paid to a trust account must be kept in the 
account until it is paid out under this Act.  
Maximum penalty–200 penalty units or 3 years 
imprisonment. 
o (2)  An amount may be paid from a trust account only in a way 
permitted under this Act.  
Maximum penalty–200 penalty units or 3 years 
imprisonment. 
 
 385  Permitted drawings from trust accounts  
o (1)  A licensee may draw an amount from the licensee's trust 
account to pay the licensee's transaction fee or transaction 
expenses in relation to a transaction only if—  
 (a)  the amount is drawn against the transaction fund 
for the transaction; and 
 (b)  the licensee is authorised to draw the amount under 
this section. 
Maximum penalty–200 penalty units or 3 years 
imprisonment. 
o (2)  The licensee is authorised—  
 (a)  to draw an amount from the transaction fund to pay 
a transaction expense when the expense becomes 
payable; and 
 (b)  when the transaction is finalised, to draw an 
amount from the transaction fund that is equal to the 
difference between—  
 (i)  the balance of the transaction fund; and 
 (ii)  the total of the licensee's transaction fee and 
any outstanding transaction expense; 
to pay the person entitled to the amount or in 
accordance with the person's written direction; and 
Example of when transaction is finalised— 
the settlement of a contract for the sale of property or 
the termination of the contract 
 (c)  to draw the licensee's transaction fee from the 
transaction fund when the amount, if any, mentioned 
in paragraph (b) has been paid and when the 
transaction is finalised. 
o (3)  For subsection (2)(b) or (c), if a dispute about the 
transaction fund arises, the transaction is not taken to be 
finalised until the licensee is authorised to pay out the 
transaction fund under section 388. 
o (4)  The licensee must pay an amount mentioned in 
subsection (2)(b) to the person entitled to it or in accordance 
with the person's written direction—  
 (a)  if the person asks, in writing, for the balance-within 
14 days after receiving the request; or 
 (b)  if the person has not asked, in writing, for the 
balance-within 42 days after the person first had the 
right to the balance. 
Maximum penalty–200 penalty units or 3 years 
imprisonment. 
o (5)  In this section—  
transaction expenses means the expenses the licensee is 
authorised to incur in connection with the performance of the 
licensee's activities for a transaction. 
transaction fee means the fees, charges and commission 
payable for the performance of the licensee's activities for a 
transaction. 
transaction fund means the amount held in a licensee's 




The seller argued to the extent that special condition 13 allowed the seller to 
be paid the money before the contract was finalised, it was void for illegality 
by virtue of the provisions of the PAMDA. 
 
Comments of the Court of Appeal 
 
The learned trial judge concluded that s 384 and s 385(2)(b) precluded the 
contractual provision operating in the manner contemplated as these statutory 
provisions only permitted the disbursement of the deposit money held by the 
agent when the transaction was finalised. 
 
Although not strictly necessary to determine (given the finding on the 
instalment contract issue), the Court of Appeal disagreed.  In opining, the 
Court of Appeal considered that the critical issue was whether PAMDA 
manifested an intention that the parties to the transaction may not lawfully 
authorise a licensee to pay moneys out of trust to one of them before the 
transaction is finalised.  In this regard, it was noted as a matter of principle 
that the fundamental common law freedom of competent parties to contract as 
they please will not be regarded as having been denied by legislation unless 
that legislative intention is clearly stated. The Court of Appeal opined that 
there were two (2) approaches to the analysis of the relevant provisions of the 
PAMDA which demonstrated that the legislature did not intend such an 
outcome. 
 
First, s 378(1) expressly contemplated that an amount of money may be 
received by a licensee, either ‘for a transaction’ or ‘with a written direction for 
its use’.  To the extent that s 385(2)(b) operates upon the assumption that the 
transaction for which the deposit has been paid has been finalised, it is limited 
in application to circumstances where the deposit has been received for a 
transaction and has no application where the deposit is received with a written 
direction for its use.  On the facts present, special condition 13 could be 
viewed as a written direction to the licensee by all the parties with any 
beneficial entitlement to the deposit money meaning that the money received 
was received with a written direction for its use rather than money received for 
a transaction.  In complying with such a written direction, the licensee would 
simply be complying with an obligation which takes its legal force from the 
general law of agency. 
 
Under an alternative second approach to the effect of these provisions of the 
PAMDA, the ‘transaction’ for which the money in question was paid could be 
viewed to be finalised if the transaction was the disposal of the money paid to 
the licensee as it could be argued that the entitlement to the money was 
resolved by special condition 13 at least on the assumption that special 
condition 13 made an immediate, final and absolute disposition of the 




The possibility of an inadvertent creation of an instalment contract is a 
constant risk in conveyancing practice.  The decision of the Court of Appeal 
serves to highlight the significance of careful drafting.  In this regard, the 
provision in the special condition that expressly provided for the deposit to be 
repayable to the purchaser in the event of breach by the seller proved to be 
critical. 
 
The dicta observations by the Court of Appeal concerning the operation of the 
PAMDA provisions regulating the ability of a licensee to release deposit 
money are also of considerable interest.  Where, as in this instance, it was the 
wish of the contractual parties for the deposit, or some part thereof, to be 
released by the licensee prior to settlement prudence may dictate that the 
contract expressly provide that the amount is received by the licensee with a 
written direction for its use as provided for by s 378(1)(b) of the PAMDA rather 
than being an amount received for a transaction of the type contemplated by s 
378(1)(a) of the PAMDA. 
 
 
A Superannuation Fund as a Buyer? 
 
 
In Bennett v Stewart3 McMurdo J considered the operation of a contract 
where the buyer was described as a superannuation fund. 
 
The Bennetts signed a standard REIQ contract as buyers of the Stewarts’ 
house and land.  However, the reference schedule to the contract document 
contained these words next to the word ‘buyer’: 
 
 ‘Bennett Superannuation Fund’ 
 
The Bennetts wished to enforce the contract. 
 
In response, the Stewarts (the sellers) raised two issues: 
 
 As the ‘Bennett Superannuation Fund’ was a trust and not a distinct 
legal entity capable of making a contract, the contract did not specify 
who was the buyer, so that the contract was void for uncertainty; and 
 The contract was unenforceable as there was no sufficient note or 
memorandum for the purposes of s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 
(Qld) as s 59 requires, amongst other things, an identification of the 
parties. 
 
McMurdo J did not accept either of these arguments and made an order for 





McMurdo J opined that the document as a whole must be considered, and 
within proper bounds, some interpretation must be sought to give the 
document the legal effect which it clearly was intended to have.  In this 
regard, the signature of the Bennetts above the word ‘buyer’ provided a strong 
indication that the Bennetts were indeed the buyers.  This was considered 
consistent with the reference to the Superannuation Fund in the schedule in 
that any acquisition of what would be an asset of the trust would be made by 
the Fund’s trustees.  McMurdo J opined: 
 
 ‘It is the fact that plainly the specified buyer in the schedule is not a distinct legal 
entity, but is a reference to a trust relationship, which indicates that when the 
Bennetts signed as the buyers, that is what they were.’4 
 
McMurdo J also accepted that there could be another rational explanation for 
the Bennett’s signatures i.e. they were signing the contract as trustees of the 
Superannuation fund.  On this alternative view, the contract was still 
considered to be sufficiently certain as the case law made it clear that for the 
                                                 
3 [2008] QSC 20. 
4 Bennett v Stewart [2008] QSC 20, [7]. 
purpose of contractual certainty, a party although unnamed, may be 
sufficiently described in other ways.  Accordingly, if the document was to be 
interpreted as a contract made by the trustees of the fund, extrinsic evidence 
could be received to identify the relevant trustees.  In this case, there was 
unchallenged evidence that the Bennetts were and remained the trustees of 
the specified trust. 
 
Section 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) 
 
As was the case for the purpose of contractual certainty, to satisfy s 59 of the 
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), McMurdo J held that a party, although 
unnamed, may be sufficiently described in other ways.  Accordingly, the 
Bennetts as trustees were sufficiently identified by the contract for the 
purposes of s 59. 
 
For the Stewarts it was argued that the contract did not describe a person or 
entity which could, with evidence, be identified; rather it described the buyer 
as something which had no legal existence for which therefore there could be 
no exercise of identification.  This argument was not accepted by McMurdo J 
on the basis that the submission only looked to the one line in the reference 
schedule and did not consider the effect of the other parts of the contract.  Nor 
was it considered to be an argument which sought to find some rational 
interpretation which would give the document the legal force which those 




Although some practitioners may be surprised by the result in this instance, 
the reasoning may be seen to be consistent with a substantial body of earlier 
case law.  When it comes to the interpretation of a contract, courts will do their 
utmost to find a find a rational interpretation which will give the contract 
certainty when it is clear that the parties intended the document to have 
contractual effect. 
 
 
 
BD 
